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Abstract
In the early 2000s, Arizona, Maine, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Vermont expanded Medicaid to cover more
low-income individuals, primarily childless adults. This change provides the researcher with an opportunity to
analyze the effects of these expansions on labor supply and welfare enrollment. I use a large data set of 176
counties over 7 years, including 3 years of pre-expansion period, 1 year of implementation year, and 3 years of
post-expansion period. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I find the most-affected counties had a 1.4
percentage-point more decline in labor force participation rate in comparison to other counties. Furthermore, I
observe a 0.32 h decrease in average weekly hours and a 1.1 % increase in average weekly wages. This indicates
labor supply was affected more than labor demand. I also observe a 0.49 % increase in Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) enrollment after the Medicaid expansions. These results are robust to an alternative
identification of the most-affected counties, inclusion of counties from comparison states, limiting the control
group to only high-poverty counties from comparison states, exclusion of county-specific time trends, and different
configuration of clustered errors. My findings provide early insights on the potential effects of new Medicaid
expansions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), since 82 % of those newly eligible are expected to be childless adults.
Keywords: Medicaid, Labor supply, Food stamps
JEL classifications: I11, I13
Background
Unlike other industrialized nations, the majority of
people in the United States are not publicly insured.
Public health insurance programs traditionally covered
low-income children, their parents, pregnant women,
the disabled, and those over age 65. On the other hand,
the individual, non-group market used to face significant
adverse selection problems before the 2010 Affordable
Care Act. Under these circumstances, many Americans
could only access affordable private health insurance
through their employer. Therefore, expansions of the
largest public insurance program, Medicaid, can have a
large effect on the labor market, by weakening the link
between health insurance and employment.
On July 30th, 1965, Medicaid was enacted as part of
the Social Security Amendments, to insure millions of
poor individuals. Over the following decades, this pro-
gram was expanded both at the federal and state levels,
becoming the largest public insurance program in the
U.S today. The effect of this expansion on labor supply
and welfare participation is not easily predictable. Ex-
panded Medicaid coverage may improve health out-
comes, thereby increasing labor supply and reducing
wages. As individuals work more, they are less likely to
participate in other welfare programs, largest of which is
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),
also known as food stamps. On the other hand, they
might have less incentive to work, since they lose eligi-
bility once earned income is over a certain threshold.
This in turn would reduce labor supply and increase
wages. Welfare participation would also increase as
more individuals leave the labor force and become aware
of other welfare programs upon enrolling in Medicaid.
In this paper, I analyze how Medicaid expansions affect
labor force and welfare participation in the U.S.
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The next phase of Medicaid expansions already began
in 2014 under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the
largest public health insurance expansion since the
“Great Society” programs of the 1960s. Those earning
less than 138 % of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) will
qualify for Medicaid, regardless of their family or
disability status. The June 2012 Supreme Court decision
effectively established Medicaid expansions as optional
for states, which resulted in 30 states and the District of
Columbia opting to expand Medicaid as of September
2015. One way to foresee potential effects of the ACA’s
large Medicaid expansions is to analyze the Medicaid
expansions of the early 2000s in several states. In
August 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services announced the Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability (HIFA) Demonstration Initiative. HIFA
allows states to seek waivers for the various provisions
of Medicaid to expand basic health insurance coverage
to groups who were not previously eligible, such as
childless adults. Arizona, Maine, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, and Vermont used HIFA waivers to
expand Medicaid. These states provide an excellent op-
portunity to analyze the effects of Medicaid expansions.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is
threefold. First, this paper includes Medicaid expansions
from 6 states representing diverse geographic regions of
the country. Second, to my knowledge, this is the first
paper to analyze the effects of Medicaid expansions on
SNAP participation. Third, this analysis provides
insights about the potential effects of the ACA’s
Medicaid expansions. Approximately, 82 % of those
newly eligible individuals for Medicaid under the ACA
are expected to be childless adults. The expansions in
the early 2000s insured mostly childless adults, since
low-income children along with their parents, and
pregnant women were already eligible prior to the
expansions.
I use a large data set of 1232 observations from 176
counties over 7 years. Observations start 3 years before
the expansion year and end 3 years after the expansion
year. To my knowledge, this is one of the largest and
longest empirical studies of Medicaid expansions cover-
ing 6 states. I combine data from 4 main sources: Local
Area Unemployment Statistics, Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages, USDA data on SNAP enroll-
ment, and the U.S. Census. One advantage of a large
data set from 6 states is that results are not dependent
on individual circumstances of a particular state.
Another advantage is that such an analysis is easily
replicable for future research since these data sources
will be updated every year by the U.S. government as
the ACA further expands Medicaid.
My empirical strategy involves a difference-in-
differences regression model to estimate the effects of
Medicaid expansions on labor supply and welfare
participation. My identification strategy is that, if a
county has a high poverty rate before the expansion, the
county would then be more likely to be affected than
counties with low poverty rates since expansions
targeted poorer populations. This strategy requires the
assumption that in the absence of these expansions,
trends in high-poverty and low-poverty counties would
not have evolved differently after the expansions. First, I
use 4 dependent variables to analyze how expansions
affected labor supply and welfare participation: labor
force participation rate, average weekly hours, average
weekly wages, and enrollment in SNAP. Second, instead
of the control group consisting of only low-poverty
counties in an expansion state, I also include all coun-
ties in a neighboring comparison state that did not
expand Medicaid. Finally, I test the robustness of my
results by excluding county-specific time trends and
clustering standard errors at state- level.
My main result is that individuals have moderately
decreased their labor supply after the expansions and
increased their participation in SNAP. I find a 1.4
percentage point decrease in labor supply and 0.49 %
increase in SNAP enrollment in high-poverty counties
after the expansions in comparison to low-poverty
counties. Both results are significant at 5 % significance
level. Furthermore, I find that average weekly hours
decreased by 0.32 h and average weekly wages increased
by 1.1 %.
These results are robust to the inclusion of counties
from neighboring non-expansion states, limiting the
control group to only high-poverty counties from
comparison states, exclusion of county-specific time
trends, and clustering of standard errors at state-level.
Low-income individuals are more likely to quit their job
or reduce their work hours to qualify for expanded
Medicaid. These individuals are also more likely to sign
up for food stamps as they become eligible for Medicaid.
My results are moderate in magnitude, smaller than
what other papers found by focusing on a single
state.
Related literature
Medicaid expansions of the 1980s and 1990s targeted
poor children, their parents, and pregnant women.
Therefore, earlier literature on the effects of these
expansions on labor supply and welfare participation is
limited to these groups. Yelowitz [9] uses the decision
by the federal government to separate Medicaid benefits
from Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program. This separation meant that children and their
mothers did not lose Medicaid benefits when they lost
AFDC benefits. He finds that Medicaid expansions of
the late 1980s led to higher labor supply and lower
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welfare participation among women with dependent
children. Unlike Yelowitz [9], I find lower labor supply
and higher welfare participation after the expansions.
Medicaid expansions in the 1980s and 1990s allowed
children to remain insured even though their mothers
earn more income than the threshold for Medicaid
eligibility. This type of expansion is likely to create incen-
tives for mothers to work and leave welfare programs. In
addition, the expansions in my data set primarily targeted
childless adults, whose incentives and behavior would be
different than mothers with dependent children.
Gruber and Madrian [7] survey over 50 papers on this
topic, and they find, at most, a weak relationship be-
tween public health insurance eligibility and labor sup-
ply for low-income mothers. By the time of the
Medicaid expansions of the early 2000s, low-income
mothers, children, and pregnant women were already
eligible for Medicaid. Therefore, most of the beneficiar-
ies from these expansions were childless adults. By
using data from the early 2000s, I am able to analyze the
labor supply and welfare participation of this group.
Analysis of this group is quite relevant today, as
approximately 82 % of those newly eligible for Medicaid
under the ACA are expected to be childless adults. My
results indicate a stronger relationship between public
health insurance eligibility and labor supply. Benefits of
having a job for a mother with dependent children may
be higher than those for a childless adult. Therefore,
public health insurance eligibility may not translate into
changes in labor supply for these mothers to the extent
that they would for childless adults.
A recent study, Dave et al. [5] examines the effects of
Medicaid expansions in the late 1980s and the early
1990s on the labor supply of pregnant women. Unlike
earlier literature, they find a 20 percentage-point
increase in Medicaid eligibility was associated with a 6
to 7 % decrease in the probability that a woman who
gave birth in the past year was employed. I focus on
expansions covering mostly childless adults and find a
smaller effect on labor supply. In addition, I expand the
analysis by adding welfare participation, rather than
focusing only on labor supply. My results find a similar
decrease in labor supply, although the magnitude is
smaller. Dave et al. [5] analyzed women who gave birth
in the past year, while the Medicaid expansions in my
data set primarily affected childless adults. For women
with children under age 1, Medicaid may be more
valuable and that would explain the larger decrease in
labor supply.
Another recent paper, Baicker et al. [2] uses Oregon’s
lottery to expand Medicaid to randomly selected, low-
income, uninsured adults. They find that Medicaid
expansions have no effect on employment or earnings,
and participation in the food stamp program increases,
while other welfare programs are not affected. Similarly, I
find that participation in the food stamp program
increases, but my results also display a moderate decrease
in labor supply with an increase in earnings. A powerful
aspect of Baicker et al. [2] is its use of a randomized
experiment to expand Medicaid, which is not always
available to researchers. I find a similar effect on welfare
participation, while finding a negative effect on labor
supply. Potentially, there are factors unique to Oregon
that affect labor supply in addition to the Medicaid
expansions. These factors may not be as prevalent in the 6
states that I study.
Garthwaite et al. [6] exploits the largest Medicaid
disenrollment in the history of the United States. In
2005, Tennessee dropped 170,000 childless adults from
Medicaid. They find large increases in labor supply, job
search behavior, employment, and private insurance
coverage in Tennessee following the disenrollment. My
results confirm that labor supply is significantly affected
by Medicaid eligibility, although I find smaller results.
Both Baicker et al. [2] and Garthwaite et al. [6] analyze a
single state: Oregon and Tennessee, respectively.
Various factors in particular states may affect the
results, besides a change in Medicaid eligibility. There-
fore, results from a single state may not be generalizable
to other states. I include Medicaid expansions from 6
states in my data set: Arizona, Maine, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, and Vermont. These states repre-
sent diverse regions of the United States and the results
may provide a more comprehensive outlook on the
effects of Medicaid expansions.
Medicaid expansions in the early 2000s
In August 2001, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) announced the Health Insurance
Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Demonstration
Initiative. HIFA waivers are variants of traditional
Medicaid section 1115 waivers, and they are designed to
provide flexibility and federal matching funds to states
that want to expand Medicaid to traditionally ineligible
groups, primarily childless adults. Atherly et al. [1]
reports that 15 states applied and received a HIFA
waiver in the early 2000s. However, only 8 of these 15
states implemented large-scale, long-term efforts to re-
duce the number of uninsured: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Michigan, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Oregon.
Colorado and Oklahoma targeted only pregnant women
and the disabled who were previously ineligible. Of the
remaining 6 states that expanded Medicaid to childless
adults, Atherly et al. [1] found no significant change in
insurance coverage in Illinois or Michigan. Both these
states had certain restrictions in eligibility that resulted in
only a very small share of the population becoming
eligible for Medicaid. In addition to the remaining 4 states,
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New York and Vermont used traditional section 1115
waivers to expand Medicaid to childless adults. Therefore,
I use data from Arizona, Maine, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, and Vermont.
Table 1 reports the waiver approval/implementation
dates, eligibility requirements, 2007 enrollment, cover-
age groups other than childless adults, and benefit
design of the expansions in 6 expansion states. Arizona
and New York were the first states to expand Medicaid
to childless adults who earn under 100 % FPL in 2001.
In Maine and Vermont, those expansions did not
include any groups other than low-income childless
adults. Arizona and New York provided full Medicaid
benefits, while other states had certain limitations. In
New Mexico in 2007, only 7,444 people were enrolled in
Medicaid, but Atherly et al. [1] found the third largest
increase in insurance coverage in this state, among 8 states
in the study, after the Medicaid expansion. Therefore, I
include New Mexico as one of my 6 expansion states.
Methods
Data
Labor supply and welfare participation
My data set is at county-level and each county-year
combination constitutes an observation. I obtained
labor supply and welfare participation data for each
county in 6 expansion states over 7 years. The first year
of observation is three years prior to the year the
Table 1 Medicaid expansions by state
State Approval Implementation Eligibility HIFA Enrollment 2007 Other groups Benefits
Arizona 12.12.2001 11.1.2001 <100 % FPL 49, 137 Some parents Full medicaid
Maine 9.13.2002 10.1.2002 <100 % FPL 17, 449 None Limited
New Mexico 8.23.2002 7.1.2005 <200 % FPL 7, 444 Some parents Limited
New York 5.30.2001 10.1.2001 <100 % FPL 98,720 Some parents Full medicaid
Oregon 10.15.2002 11.1.2002 <100 % FPL 41, 057 Children, pregnant women Limited
Vermont 9.27.2005 10.1.2005 <150 % FPL 35,700 None Limited
Table 2 Summary statistics
Panel A: All counties
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Number of Counties 176
Labor force participation rate 1,232 0.58805 0.5928 0.057 0.394 0.784
Average weekly hours worked 1,232 33.3 32.9 2.223 31.2 36.5
Average weekly wages 1,232 536.2465 515.85 115.368 398 748
Food stamps 1,232 5328.50 5,296.50 1,245 2,567 401,684
Poverty rate 1,232 12.3215 11.875 3.8855 3.8 38.9
Female 1,232 50.9 51.2 1.2 48.3 53.5
Black 1,232 3.097 0.95 5.7 0 43
Hispanic 1,232 7.1725 2.945 10.8775 0.4 81.9
Panel B: Counties by state
State AZ ME NM NY OR VT
Number of Counties 15 16 33 62 36 14
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.534 0.629 0.618 0.621 0.624 0.689
Average weekly hours worked 33.6 31.8 32.1 34.1 32.4 32
Average weekly wages 501 518 505 556 527.5 582
Food stamps 12*313 6,420.5 4,979.2 5,235 4,094.5 3,368.5
Poverty rate 15.6 10.1 18 13.1 13.2 10.7
Female 50.1 51.2 50.3 50.7 50.3 50.4
Black 1.1 0.4 0.4 3.8 0.4 0.5
Hispanic 25.9 0.7 42.1 15.1 8 0.9
*Each county is observed for 7 years, leading to 1,232 observations
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Fig. 1 a. Total Medicaid enrollment in expansion and comparison states as a percentage of 2002 enrollment. Source: The Medicaid Analytical Extract
(MAX) data, produced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. b. Medicaid enrollment by each expansion state and its comparison state as a
percentage of 2002 enrollments. Source: The Medicaid Analytical Extract (MAX) data, produced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
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Medicaid expansion became effective and the last year
of observation is three years after the expansion year.
Medicaid expansions may take some time to be imple-
mented, since individuals are not immediately aware of
their new eligibility. As a robustness check, I also
collected the same data for 5 neighboring comparison
states that did not expand Medicaid: Nevada as the
control state for Arizona, New Hampshire for Maine
and Vermont, Colorado for New Mexico, Pennsylvania
for New York and Washington for Oregon.
For each county over the 7 years of analysis, I
obtained labor force participation rate and average
Fig. 2 County maps by poverty rate
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weekly hours worked from the Local Area Unemploy-
ment Statistics,1 made available by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Labor force participation rate is the
percentage of the people over age 16 who participate in
the labor force, either employed or unemployed. I use
these two dependent variables to measure the changes
in labor supply after the expansions. In addition, I
obtained average weekly wages by county and year from
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,2 also
provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This
dependent variable helps me determine whether the
change in wages after the expansions is consistent with
the changes in labor supply. I use county-level enroll-
ment in SNAP (food stamps),3 provided by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. In fiscal year 2014, this
program supplied approximately 46.5 million Americans
with an average of $125.35 per person per month in food
assistance.
Poverty rate and demographics by county
I use the poverty rate by county to identify which
counties in an expansion state are most likely to be
affected by the expansion, since these expansions mostly
covered childless adults under poverty. The U.S. Census
reports county poverty rates through Small Area
Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE).4 I regard coun-
ties in a state with over 75th percentile of all poverty
rates across all counties in that state as my treatment
counties. As an alternative identification of treatment
counties, I obtained county uninsurance rates from the
Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE), also
published by the U.S. Census Burau.5 SAHIE was first
launched in 2000, with updated estimates in 2005 and
the following years. I use data from 2000 SAHIE, which
is a year before the first expansions in Arizona and New
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Fig. 3 Pre and post-expansion trends for labor force participation rate
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Demographics of a county may have affects on labor
supply and welfare participation. The U.S. Census Bureau
provides data on county demographics,6 where I obtained
four county-level demographic variables by year: popula-
tion, female, black, and Hispanic shares of the population.
Summary statistics
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the data analysis.
My data set includes 176 counties from 6 states,
observed over 7 years: 3 years before the expansion +
expansion year + 3 years afterwards. In panel A, I report
mean, median, standard deviation and range of all
variables, while the medians of the same variables are
reported in Panel B for counties by state.
Mean labor force participation rate was around 59 %,
with the lowest in Arizona and the highest in Vermont.
Average weekly hours were 33.3 h, with the lowest in
Maine and the highest in New York. Average weekly
wage was around $536, with the lowest in Arizona and
the highest in Vermont. Approximately 5,328 people
were on food stamps in an average county, with the
highest participation in Arizona and the lowest in
Vermont. New Mexico and Arizona had higher poverty
rates than the other states. New York had the highest
share of African Americans per county, while New
Mexico and Arizona had the highest share of Hispanics.
Figures 1a and 1b display Medicaid enrollment as a per-
centage of 2002 enrollment in both expansion and com-
parison states. Enrollment has been steadily increasing for
both groups, but expansion states report more than
double the increase in comparison states during the early
2000s. Total Medicaid enrollment in the 6 expansion
states increased by about 23 versus 10 % in comparison
states. Such a change in Medicaid enrollment may have ef-
fects on labor supply and welfare participation.
Figure 2 includes a map of the 6 states in my data set.
Shaded counties have higher than 75th percentile of
poverty rates across all counties in the same state. They
constitute my treatment group. Other counties are my
control group, as Medicaid expansions are less likely to
affect those counties.
Econometric Method
This section presents my main empirical results. I first
introduce the difference-in-differences model in sec-
tion Economic method. I then examine changes in labor
supply (section Labor supply). In sections Average
weekly hours and Average weekly wages, I demonstrate
how Medicaid expansions affected average weekly hours
and average weekly wages, respectively. In section SNAP
enrollment, I estimate the effects of these expansions on
SNAP enrollment. Finally, in section Robustness, I
analyze the robustness of my results to the inclusion of
counties from neighboring non-expansion states,
exclusion of county-specific time trends, and clustering
of standard errors at state-level.
First, I estimate the following difference-in-differences
regression model to measure the effects of Medicaid
expansions on 4 dependent variables:
yct ¼ αc þ δt þ β1PosttxPovertyct þ β2Postt
þβ3Povertyct þ β5Xct þ β6Implementt




xCountyc x t þ εct
ð1Þ
Table 3 Estimated effects of medicaid expansions on labor
force participation rate dependent variable: Labor force
participation rate
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post1 −0.011 – −0.009 –
(0.012) – (0.010) –
Implement1 −0.015 – −0.013 –
(0.069) – (0.064) –
Post1*Poverty −0.13** – – –
(0.06) – – –
Implement1*Poverty −0.09* – – –
(0.05) – – –
Post2 – −0.015 – −0.012
– (0.013) – (0.011)
Implement2 – −0.014 – −0.014
– (0.012) – (0.090)
Post2*Poverty – −0.16** – –
– (0.07) – –
Implement2*Poverty – −0.08* – –
– (0.05) – –
Post1*Treated – – −1.5** –
– – (0.60) –
Implement1*Treated – – −0.9** –
– – (0.40) –
Post2*Treated – – – −1.4***
– – – (0.50)
Implement2*Treated – – – −0.8*
– – – (0.05)
Constant 0.3116 0.285 0.3233 0.2978
(0.2867) (0.3456) (0.3187) (0.3320)
County demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1232 1232 1232 1232
R2 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.72
Standard errors are clustered by county and given in parantheses. *indicates
p < 0.10, **indicates p < 0.05, ***indicates P < 0.01
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where the variableyctrepresents one of the 4 outcomes
for county c and year t: labor force participation rate,
average weekly hours, average weekly wages, and SNAP
enrollment. is a binary variable with value 1 after the
Medicaid expansions are implemented; Povertyctis the
poverty rate of county c in year t; is a set of variables
representing county demographics (population, gender,
poverty, and race); is a binary variable with value 1
during the implementation years; and is the county-
specific time trend. The model includes county fixed
effects (αc), year fixed effects (δt), and an error term (εct)-
that is assumed to be uncorrelated with other
unobserved determinants of the outcome variable.
The main coefficient of interest is β1, which is the
difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the
Medicaid expansion. A negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient would indicate that counties with higher
poverty rates had a decrease in labor force participation
(or other dependent variables) after the Medicaid
expansions, as more people quit their jobs to qualify for
expanded Medicaid.
I use two different specifications of (Postt) to identify
the post-expansion period: Post1 includes the second
and third year after the expansion year, while Post2
includes only the third year. There are two reasons for
these alternative specifications. First, states imple-
mented Medicaid expansions in varying months and
years. For example, Arizona’s Medicaid expansion was
implemented in November 2001, while Vermont’s
expansion became effective in October 2005. It can take
more than a year for a significant portion of the newly
eligible population to participate in this expansion, since
many newly eligible, uninsured, childless adults do not
become immediately aware of these expansions. Second,
it can also take considerable time for the expansions to
affect labor supply and welfare participation, since
some individuals might delay making such major deci-
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Fig. 4 Pre and post-expansion trends for average weekly hours worked
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with the post-expansion period, I use two alternative
specifications to identify the implementation period:
Implement1t and Implement2t. The former takes the
value 1 for both in the year Medicaid expansion became
effective along with the following year, while the latter
also includes the 2 years after the expansion.
One concern with county-level analyses is that reces-
sions or contemporaneous policy changes at both
federal and state levels can differentially affect some
counties. One advantage of this data set is that it
includes data from the late 1990s (AZ and NY) to early
2008 (VT). This time period provides three full years of
data after a state’s Medicaid expansion, but avoids
potential confounding effects arising from the 2008
recession, which started to affect the labor market in
the second half of 2008 [3].
In an alternative specification of eq. (1), I replace
Povertyct with Treatedct, which is a binary variable
indicating that the observed county was one of the
poorest counties in the expansion state (over 75th
percentile of all county poverty rates in the same state).
This alternative specification is my preferred specifica-
tion for two reasons. First, the continuous variable,
Povertyct, assumes a linear relationship between county
poverty rate and the dependent variable. Second, the
results would be more robust to measurement errors in
Povertyct, if a binary variable is used.
Results
Labor supply
I start with examining the trends in labor force partici-
pation rate before and after the expansions. Figure 3
presents the share of residents participating in the labor
force for each state. In all expansion states, labor force
participation rate was evolving similarly before the
expansions in both poorest counties and other counties.
After the expansions, however, I observe a faster decline
in labor force participation rate in the poorest counties
of 5 states, with the share of residents in the labor force
of the poorest counties dropping by roughly 1 percent-
age point more than those in other counties. By
contrast, trends in other counties were similar to pre-
expansion trends.
Table 3 displays the estimates of eq. (1), where the
dependent variable is the labor force participation rate. In
all four specifications, I control for county fixed effects,
year fixed effects, county demographics, and county-spe-
cific time trend. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
for the continuous version of county poverty, for the
first and second versions of Postt/Implementt, respect-
ively. Main variables of interest are the interactions
between Povertyct and the two versions of Postt:
Post1*Poverty and Post2*Poverty. In general, coeffi-
cients are small, negative, and statistically significant.
Column 1 indicates that a county with 1 percentage-
point higher poverty rate than another county in the
same state would have 0.13 percentage point drop in
labor force participation rate two and three years
after the expansion. This effect is statistically signifi-
cant at 5 % significance level. When the post-
expansion period is defined as only the third year
after the expansion year, Column 2 indicates that the
drop in labor force participation rate is slightly
higher: 0.16 percentage points and also statistically
significant at 5 % significance level. This translates
into a 1.6 percentage point drop in labor force
Table 4 Estimated effects of medicaid expansions on average
weekly hours dependent variable: Average weekly hours
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post1 0.023 – 0.019 –
(0.014) – (0.015) –
Implement1 0.015 – 0.012 –
(0.048) – (0.044) –
Post1*Poverty −0.033** – – –
(0.014) – – –
Implement1*Poverty −0.025* – – –
(0.015) – – –
Post2 – 0.017 – 0.25
– (0.012) – (0.017)
Implement2 – 0.013 – 0.16
– (0.042) – (0.044)
Post2*Poverty – −0.031*** – –
– (0.012) – –
Implement2*Poverty – −0.022* – –
– (0.013) – –
Post1*Treated – – −0.29** –
– – (0.014) –
Implement1*Treated – – −0.23** –
– – (0.011) –
Post2*Treated – – – −0.32**
– – – (0.013)
Implement2*Treated – – – −0.26**
– – – (0.015)
Constant 0.2875 0.2789 0.2684 0.2569
(0.2267) (0.2352) (0.2411) (0.2173)
County demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1232 1232 1232 1232
R2 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.59
Standard errors are clustered by county and given in parantheses. *indicates
p < 0.10, **indicates p < 0.05, ***indicates P < 0.01
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participation for a county with a 10 percentage-point
higher poverty rate. I do not observe any significant
effects on labor force participation at 5 % significance
level during the implementation years.
Columns 3 and 4 include the binary version of county
poverty (Treatedc), for the first and second versions
ofPostt/Implementt, respectively. Main variables of inter-
est are the interactions between Treatedc and the two
versions ofPostt: Post1*Treated and Post2*Treated. As in
the first two columns, coefficients are small, negative,
and statistically significant. Column 3 displays that a
high-poverty county had 1.5 percentage point lower
labor force participation rate two and three years after
the expansion. This effect is statistically significant at
5 % significance level. Column 4 reports a 1.4 percent-
age point drop when the post-expansion period includes
only the third year after the expansion year. This effect
is statistically significant even at 1 % significance level.
Average weekly hours
In order to qualify for expanded Medicaid, some individ-
uals may choose to reduce their weekly hours rather
than dropping out of the labor force. By doing so, their
earnings would still be below the maximum income
thresholds for Medicaid. Such a choice by a part of the
population can translate into reduced average weekly
hours in that county. In Fig. 4, I plot the trends in
average weekly hours between poorest counties and
other counties over time. Before the expansions, average
weekly hours were stable over time in both sets of coun-
ties in 4 of the 6 expansion states. In New Mexico and
Arizona, however, there was a slight downward trend in
average weekly prior to the expansions. Following the
expansions, I observe a further decline in average weekly
hours in every state except New Mexico. In New
Mexico, the same trends before the expansions continue
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Fig. 5 Pre and post-expansion trends for average weekly wages
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per week in average weekly hours. Since the average
weekly hours per county was 33.3 h in my data set, this
corresponds to a 0.6 % decrease in average weekly hours
after the expansions.
Table 4 reports the estimates of eq. (1), where the
dependent variable is the average weekly hours. Similar
to Table 3, I control for county fixed effects, year fixed
effects, county demographics, and county-specific time
trend. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for the
continuous version of county poverty, for the first and
second versions of Postt/implementt, respectively. In
general, coefficients are small, negative, and statistically
significant. Column 1 indicates that a county with 1
percentage-point higher poverty rate than other coun-
ties in the same state would have 0.033 h per week
decrease in average weekly hours two and three years
after the expansion. This effect is statistically significant
at 5 % significance level. With the second version of the
post-expansion period, Column 2 indicates that the
drop in average weekly hours is slightly lower: 0.031 h
and also statistically significant at 5 % significance level.
This translates into a 0.9 % drop in labor force partici-
pation for a county with 10 percentage point higher
poverty rate. I also observe significant, yet small effects
on average weekly hours at 5 % significance level during
the implementation years.
Columns 3 and 4 include the binary version of county
poverty (Treatedc), for the first and second versions of
Postt/Implementt, respectively. Similar to the first two
columns, coefficients are small, negative, and statistically
significant. Column 3 displays high-poverty counties
have 0.29 h lower average weekly hours, two and three
years after the expansion. This effect is statistically
significant at 5 % significance level. Column 4 reports a
0.32 h drop when the post-expansion period includes
only the third year after the expansion year. This effect
is statistically significant even at 1 % significance level.
Average weekly wages
Since Medicaid expansions changed the eligibility
criteria for individuals, rather than changing incentives
of employers, I expect the expansions to affect labor
supply rather than labor demand. I evaluate this by
analyzing the changes in average weekly wages, since a
decrease in labor supply would suggest an increase in
wages for the remaining employees. Figure 5 plots the
average weekly wages over time for the poorest counties
and other counties. In 5 of the 6 states, I observe a slight
increase in wages after the expansions in poorest coun-
ties. Before the expansions, average weekly wages evolve
similarly. I observe around 1 % increase in average
weekly wages after the expansions.
Table 5 displays the estimated effects of Medicaid
expansions on natural logarithm of average weekly
wages. Coefficients on the interactions of post-
expansion period and county poverty are small, positive,
and statistically significant at 5 % significance level. In
column 1, I observe an increase in average weekly wages
of 0.9 %, two and three years after the expansions, when
a county has 10-percentage point more poverty. For the
second version of post-expansion period, the same
effect is 0.8 % in Column 2. Since the average weekly
wages in my data set is $536, this would suggest a $4.3
increase in wages in the poorest counties.
I observe similar small but positive effects when I use
a binary version of county poverty. Average weekly
Table 5 Estimated effects of medicaid expansions on average
weekly wages dependent variable: Log (average weekly wages)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post1 0.0017 – 0.014 –
(0.013) – (0.015) –
lmplementl 0.0014 – 0.016 –
(0.046) – (0.043) –
Post1*Poverty 0.0009** – – –
(0.004) – – –
Implement1*Poverty 0.0007* – – –
(0.004) – – –
Post2 – 0.0015 – 0.016
– (0.012) – (0.012)
lmplement2 – 0.0013 – 0.015
– (0.039) – (0.043)
Post2*Poverty – 0.0008** – –
– (0.004) – –
lmplement2*Poverty – 0.0006* – –
– (0.005) – –
Post1*Treated – – 0.012** –
– – (0.006) –
Implement1*Treated – – 0.006** –
– – (0.003) –
Post2*Treated – – – 0.011**
– – – (0.005)
Implement2*Treated – – – 0.008*
– – – (0.005)
Constant 0.2631 0.2678 0.2613 0.2436
(0.2371) (0.2392) (0.2387) (0.2233)
County demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1232 1232 1232 1232
R2 0.57 0.59 0.63 0.64
Standard errors are clustered by county and given in parantheses. *indicates
p < 0.10, **indicates p < 0.05, ***indicates P < 0.01
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wages increase by 1.2 % in poorest counties two and
three years after the expansions (Column 3). This is also
significant at 5 % significance level. When I restrict the
post-expansion period to only the third year after the
expansions, Colum 4 indicates that the same effect is
1.1 %. Therefore, I find evidence of a slight wage
increase following the expansions. The decrease in labor
supply as some individuals drop out of the labor force
to qualify for expanded Medicaid translates into higher
wages for the remaining employees in poorest counties.
Another factor that may be in play here is that compan-
ies have an incentive to pay their employees more when
they do not have to finance insurance of some
employees, since they now obtain insurance from
expanded Medicaid.
SNAP enrollment
Since Medicaid is a means-tested program, participation
in this program may increase the awareness of other
means-tested programs. The largest welfare program, by
number of participants in the US is the Food Stamp
Program (SNAP). In fiscal year 2014, roughly 46.5
million Americans received an average of $125.35 per
month in food assistance.7 Even though this program
has many beneficiaries, literature on the effects of
Medicaid expansions on SNAP is very limited.
In Fig. 6, I observe an initial increase in food stamps
participation followed by stabilization. There was an
8-month long recession in 2001, which explains the
initial increase. After the recession of 2001, GDP growth
rates remained positive each year until 2008. The
poorest counties in all states display a small increase in
SNAP enrollment after the expansions.
Table 6 reports the regression estimates with natural
logarithm of SNAP enrollment as the dependent
variable. Interaction of the post-expansion period
and county poverty has small, positive, and statistically
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Fig. 6 Pre and post-expansion trends for Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program Enrollment
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Column 1 indicates SNAP enrollment increases by
0.6 %, two and three years after the expansions, when a
county has 10-percentage points more poverty than other
counties. For the second version of the post-expansion
period, I observe a 0.5 % increase in Column 2.
Binary version of county poverty also yields small but
positive effects. SNAP enrollment increases by 0.52 %
two and three years after the expansions (Column 3),
and this is significant at 5 % significance level. With the
second version of poverty, Column 4 reports a 0.49 %
increase. In all regression specifications, I find increases
in SNAP enrollment following the expansions. As
individuals leave the labor force, sign up for Medicaid,
and become more aware of other welfare programs, they
are more likely to enroll in SNAP.
Robustness
My identification strategy involves comparing counties by
poverty rate, as counties with the highest poverty rates are
likely to have a greater number of individuals who become
eligible for Medicaid after the expansions. Another way to
expand the control group of counties is to include coun-
ties from a neighboring comparison state that did not ex-
pand Medicaid. This, along with counties in the expansion
state that are less than 75th percentile of the poverty rate,
will make up the control group. In this case, treated coun-
ties are the counties in the expansion state that have
greater than 75th percentile of the poverty rate across all
counties in that state. I report the results with this ex-
panded control group of counties in the first column of
Table 7. Each row corresponds to a separate regression
and I display only the coefficient for the main variable of
interest. My results are robust to the inclusion of counties
from comparison states as part of my control group.
Labor force participation and average weekly hours show
small but significant decreases after the Medicaid expan-
sions. In addition, average weekly wages and SNAP enroll-
ment show an increase.
There may be different trends in high-poverty coun-
ties versus low-poverty counties. If these trends were
driving the results, then defining the control group as a
mix of low-poverty counties in an expansion state and
high-poverty counties in a comparison state would
confound the results. To address this potential problem,
I restrict my control group to only the high-poverty
counties in a comparison state. With this restriction, I
compare the effects of the Medicaid expansions on
high-poverty counties in relation to the trends in high-
poverty counties in neighboring states that did not
expand Medicaid during the same period. I report the
results with this restricted control group in the second
column of Table 7. Results are very similar and I do not
have evidence to claim that the choice of control group
is driving the results.
Difference-in-differences approach does not require
county-specific time trends to be included as control
variables. One way to check the robustness of my results
is to rerun the regressions without the county-specific
time trends. The third column of Table 7 includes the
coefficients for my main variable of interest without any
county-specific time trends. For labor force participa-
tion rate, average weekly hours, and SNAP enroll-
ment, the coefficients still have the same sign and
significance. On the other hand, although average
weekly wages still increase following the Medicaid
Table 6 Estimated effects of medicaid expansions on food
stamps dependent variable: Lou (food stamp enrollment)
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post1 0.015 – 0.014 –
(0.012) – (0.013) –
Implement1 0.011 – 0.010 –
(0.038) – (0.031) –
Post1*Poverty 0.0006** – – –
(0.0003) – – –
Implement1*Poverty 0.0008* – – –
(0.0005) – – –
Post2 – 0.013 – 0.013
– (0.011) – (0.013)
lmplement2 – 0.012 – 0.015
– (0.035) – (0.041)
Post2*Poverty – 0.0005** – –
– (0.0002) – –
lmplement2*Poverty – 0.0007* – –
– (0.0004) – –
Post1*Treated – – 0.0052** –
– – (0.0024) –
Implement1*Treated – – 0.007** –
– – (0.0030) –
Post2*Treated – – – 0.0049**
– – – (0.0023)
lmplement2*Treated – – – 0.0042*
– – – (0.0026)
Constant 0.2512 0.2567 0.2641 0.2444
(0.2163) (0.2281) (0.2114) (0.2567)
County demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1232 1232 1232 1232
R2 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52
Standard errors are clustered by county and given in parantheses. *indicates
p < 0.l0. ** indicates p < 0.05. ***indicates P < 0.01
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expansions, this effect is only statistically significant
at 10 % significance level.
If an omitted variable causes correlation between obser-
vations across counties, then the error terms would also
demonstrate this correlation. I address this potential issue
by clustering standard errors at county-level in all my
regressions. However, there are large differences in the
underlying population in each county and this clustering
approach may not be valid [8]. One way to check robust-
ness of my results is to cluster standard errors by state,
although clustering on only a few states is not always opti-
mal [4]. I report the results with standard errors clustered
at state-level in the last column of Table 7 where all the
coefficients still have the same sign and significance level.
Therefore, I rule out the possibility that the precision of
standard errors is driving the results.
Discussion
Potential for selection bias
Prior to the Medicaid expansions, the poorest counties
in expansions states may have already had different
characteristics in labor supply and welfare participation.
If this is the case, then the regression results may reflect
selection bias. I compare the poorest counties in expan-
sion states to the poorest counties in comparison states
for the mean value of 4 dependent variables. The differ-
ence between two means for each of the 4 dependent
variables is statistically insignificant at 5 % significance
level and I fail to reject the hypothesis that poorest
counties in the expansion states are different than the
poorest counties in comparison states.
Potential for omitted variable bias
Ideally, I would prefer to control for other economic
factors that can affect the 4 dependent variables.
However, such economic factors are likely to be deter-
mined endogenously with labor force participation,
average weekly hours, wages, and SNAP enrollment. In-
clusion of a control variable, such as unemployment
rate, may bias the results due to this endogeneity. One
way to mitigate this omitted variable concern is to in-
clude both county and year fixed effects, which I do in
all specifications of my regressions. These fixed effects
would account for the factors that are unique within a
county and across counties within the same year.
Conclusions
This research shows that Medicaid expansions in 6
states led to small, but significant effects on labor force
participation, average weekly hours, wages, and SNAP
enrollment. After controlling for county fixed effects,
year fixed effects, county-specific time trend, and four
county-level demographic variables, I find 1.4 % de-
crease in labor force participation rate, 0.32 h decrease
in working hours, 1.1 % increase in wages, and 0.49 %
increase in SNAP enrollment in poorest counties of 6
expansion states. In addition, I expand my control coun-
ties to include all counties in a neighboring comparison
state. Results are robust to the inclusion of these coun-
ties in comparison states, limiting the control group to
only high-poverty counties from comparison states, ex-
clusion of county-specific time trends, and clustering
standard errors at state-level.
One limitation of this research is that Medicaid expan-
sions affected a small share of the population in each
county and data is not available at individual-level for
the 4 dependent variables. Individual-level data do
not disclose each individual’s county due to privacy
concerns. Therefore, I am unable to analyze labor
supply and welfare participation of individuals who
Table 7 Robustness of the results
Dependent variable Neighboring states High-poverly counties No time trend Clustering at state-level
Labor force participation rate - Post2*Treated −1.16** −1.19*** −1.24** −1.23**
(0.54) (0.45) (0.58) (0.61)
Average weekly hours - Post2*Treated −0.29** −0.24** −0.31** −0.28**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Log (weekly wages)-Post2*Treated 0.012** 0.013** 0.014* 0.010**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Log (food stamp enrollment)-Post2*Treated 0.0045** 0.0042** 0.0047** 0.0043**
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0021)
County demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-specific time trend Yes Yes No Yes
N 2604 651 1232 1232
R2 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.46
Standard errors are clustered by county except for last column and given in parantheses. *indicates p < 0.10, **indicates p < 0.0 ***indicates P < 0.01
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actually gained Medicaid after these expansions. How-
ever, I still find small, but significant effects on labor
supply and welfare participation at county-level. Even
though the expansions affect a small share of the po-
pulation, I observe county-level effects due to changes
in labor supply and welfare participation of the ex-
pansion population.
My findings provide support for Medicaid expansions’
moderate effects on labor supply and welfare participation,
as individuals become more likely to leave the labor force
and enroll in welfare programs. This result implies that
expanding Medicaid to childless adults under the Afford-
able Care Act may lead to a slight decrease in labor force
participation and an increase in enrollment of other
welfare programs. However, as millions of previously un-
insured people gain insurance under the ACA, benefits of
having insurance may outweigh the negative and moder-
ate effects on labor supply and welfare participation. Since
the major provisions of the ACA have been implemented
in 2014, it would take a few more years to observe how
these factors play out in the labor market.
Endnotes
1Data and documentation are available from the BLS
website: http://www.bls.gov/lau/
2Data and documentation are available from the BLS
website: http://www.bls.gov/cew/
3Data and documentation are available from the USDA
website: http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutri-
tion-assistance-program-snap
4Data and documentation are available from the
US Census Bureau website: http://www.census.gov/
did/www/saipe/
5Data and documentation are available from the
US Census Bureau website: http://www.census.gov/
did/www/sahie/
6Data and documentation are available from the US
Census Bureau website: https://www.census.gov/support/
USACdataDownloads.html
7"SNAP Monthly Data". Fns.usda.gov. 6 February 2015.
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